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Locating myself at the 
intercultural hyphen 
A useful way to understand these relationships can be explained by what Michelle Fine (1994) 
describes as an intercultural hyphen, which is that little grammatical dash that exists within the 
conjoined word ‘Māori-Pākehā’
Meeting, but different – the line that “joins as well as separates” (Jones, 2017, p.187) 
As a Pākehā attempting to work with Māori in spaces where Māori ways of being and doing are 
the norm, then my ways of being and doing have to be being-with and doing-with
Being Pākehā is about being relational
What does this mean in practice?
Parallel timelines, in Citizen, 2019, p. 37
• Regularly meeting with kaumātua
• Recognising that I am not ‘leading’ the project
• Listening as an active practice
• Not interrupting
• Face to face, not email
• Time is as long as it takes and when it happens
• Attending hui with tangata whenua/ mana whenua where 
my credibility is established when others talk for me
• Attempting to be guided by existing kaupapa – values 
based, not task-orientated
• Being my authentic self 
• Not assuming that there is a one-to-one correspondence 
between concepts
• Sometimes having parallel conversations in different 
worlds
Attempting to work in partnership
Pre-trades students at Longveld contemplate their 
prototype waka. It was the first ever attempt at 
considering how the public art sculpture that would 
become known as Tōia Mai, might actually be built    
Anthropocene?
Calls from posthumanist/new materialist/speculative 
realist/material vitalist etc writers to depart from the causal 
and deterministic models of the Western Enlightenment 
project, in favour of more non-humancentric ontological 
understandings of how the universe operates
More relational approaches that emphasise the agencies of 
nonhumans within phenomena 
e.g. Barad (2008), Bennett (2010), Booth (2014), Delanda
(2016), Gratton (2014), Meillassoux (2008), Salter (2010), 
Shaviro (2014), Stern (2013) et al.
“the Anthropocene is not simply a geologic epoch; it 
is an opportunity to embrace a new ontology. In it, we 
can reconfigure our orientation to the material 
world.”
Benson, 2019, p. 252
Typically framed within 
Western realist traditions 
that claim superiority of 
knowledge through 
rationalist and positivist 
modes of knowing the 
world
Why reach for…
Deleuze (2004) instead of Deloria (1999b), 
Bennett (2010) rather than Bungee (1984), 
Guattari (2005) rather than Garroutte (2003), 
Massumi (2002) rather than Marker (2018), 
Alaimo (2016) rather than Atleo (2007), and so on
Rosiek, Snyder & Pratt, 2019, p.2
Multiple Māori indigenous understandings of the universe as being 
interwoven, interfused, and interrelational, and without assuming human 
exceptionalism with regards to who or what is capable of knowledge, 
agency or volition
For example: Durie (2017), Hēnare (2015), Hoskins & Jones (2017), Jones (2013), 
Marsden (1965/2003), Matamua (2017), Mika (2018), Royal (2017), Salmond (1985), 
Stewart (2016), and Smith (2017), just to name a few 
Western Realism
Usually based on what it can measure in terms 
of the abstraction of numbers and their logical 
relations. There’s a tendency within Western 
philosophical trajectories to consider these 
logics as being universally applicable and yet 
somehow without influence of their own
Western Enlightenment Project typically 
positioned technology as continually ‘advancing’ 
but without its own agency
Matter traditionally considered as being 
atomistic, dumb and inert  - Nature an an
infinite and passive resource   
Anthropological bias: Māori Indigenous claims of the interwoven nature of reality historically invalidated 
through simplistic binary understandings of animate and inanimate. Western anthropologists failed to 
understand distinctions between mauri (life force) and hau or hā (the breath of life), because they assumed 
that Māori “regarded all material objects as being indwelt by spirits” (Marsden, 1965/2003, p.44)
Bennett (2010) identifies how technologies such as electrical power grids have agency within what she and 
others describe as assemblages. But her material vitalism is limited to Western conceptions of both realism 
and an Othered understanding of animism
In Western philosophical traditions, any claim upon reality which is considered to be 
spiritual tends to be automatically situated into a dualist schema that distinguishes 
between Eurocentric ‘idealist’ and ‘realist’ positions, themselves arising out specific 
religious, political and economic turbulences
What might this mean here in Aotearoa-New Zealand when considering those entities such as 
rivers and mountains, that we are  recognised as both tūpuna and taonga? How for instance, 
should hydroelectrical generation be approached when rivers are recognised as legal persons 
in their own right? What ramifications does this have for our innovation discourses and 
attempts to mitigate the worst excesses of climate change? 
Objective truth based on ontological 
distinctions between thinking and being 
Foremost in making these claims was the philosopher Rene Descartes, whose 
work provided the foundation upon which Newton developed his machinic laws 
of motion and Kant asserted the universality of his sensible concepts
Descartes believed our senses lie to us
• Writing in 1641, Descartes was enculturated by older Christian conceptions of heaven and spirituality 
being informed by Plato’s cave and Aristotle’s Ideas, both of which position ‘true’ reality as existing 
elsewhere in a nonmaterial form. Humans also have “have dominion over the natural world” (Genesis, 1: 
26). Only humans can be rational. Animals are “unthinking automata” (Shaviro, 2014, p.87). 
• Recent inventions like the telescope and microscope revealed parts of the universe that human senses 
alone couldn’t perceive
• Plagued by doubt that he existed, could no longer rely on perception alone. Only rational thought 
remained, therefore: “I think, I am”
• Only through “an intuition of the mind”. (Descartes 1641, in Haldane 1911, p.11) could he be sure he 
existed
• Ideas are therefore “clear and distinct”, for if they were not, then his claim that his ability to think these 
clear and distinct ideas, could be doubted. As his claim ““I think, I am” cannot be doubted, all clear and 
distinct ideas must be true.” (Retrieved 16th September 2020, from: 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Rene-Descartes/Meditations)
• Sounds like a circular argument? It is! Welcome to the birth of Cartesian dualism between nature and 
culture!
In a Māori indigenous worldview, 
“humans are inseparable from all that exists” 
(Mika, 2017, p.39)
No ontological bifurcation 
between thinking and being
“Philosophically, Māori do not see themselves as separate from nature, humanity, and 
the natural world, being direct descendants of Earth Mother. Thus, the resources of 
the earth do not belong to humankind; rather, humans belong to the earth”
(Hēnare, 2015, p. 82)
Has ramifications for what Western notions of 
what does or doesn’t count as knowledge, or 
what is or isn’t knowable, and by who or what? 
Semiotic meaning itself becomes 
problematised as correspondences between 
reference and referent cannot be taken for 
granted 
Re-presentation, the notion of symbolic form, 
visual and sonic metaphors - all informed by 
Cartesian dualism – compromises supposed 
intangibility of ideation and information 
In practice this looks like:
• Not taking my own cultural beliefs about what 
knowledge is, or who creates it, as universally true 
• Being critical of claims that position thinking and 
spirituality as lacking substance, and materiality as 
more tangible and without agency
• Questioning my tendency to privilege knowledge 
that is measurable
• Trying to remember that three dimensional 
Cartesian spatiality is co-constituted by an 
imaginary origin point known as zero
• Trying not to recreate Cartesian frameworks whilst 
trying to avoid them! 
Worldedness
A term used by Carl Mika (2017) to refer to a common premise amongst Indigenous 
writers, which is “the confluence of all things in the world, such as there is an 
underlying driving move of all things to be in conversation with each other.” 
Mika, 2017, p. 38
Inter-relationality with place:
“One’s personality, indeed one’s self formation, ultimately depends on one’s tribal 
identity. Landscapes have the capacity to shape how we think. Tau (2001) argues 
here, in line with Maori epistemology, that Maori knowledge reflected the self onto 
the landscape. In that act, place and self are inseparable, being immediately 
informed by each other” 
Mika, 2017, p. 41
In practice, what could this mean for this Pākehā?
• Attempting to consider Matariki as 
a doorway concept to an 
interconnected world
• Attempting to let go of my 
Cartesian predispositions when 
kaumātua Tame Pokaia described 
the stars of Matariki as having “a 
domain and a function” and are 
“doorways to information” (Pokaia, 
in Citizen, 2019, p. 77)
• Being open to ways of being and 
knowing the world that don’t 
automatically ‘make sense’
Illustration by Juliann Smith, used with permission
If the Anthropocene is to be engaged with 
by collaborations between artists and 
scientists here in Aotearoa, it becomes
vitally important that domain practitioners 
recognise the cultural traditions that co-
constitute their practice 
Just because Western post-humanism now 
admits Nature as possessing agency in an 
interrelated world, does not mean that it is 
particularly aware of, or willing to, 
relinquish all of its modernist infrastructure
‘Mapping the Anthropocene’, for instance, 
is cartographic – when the supposed 
neutrality of Cartesian representation 
cannot be taken for granted
Innovation discourse
Illustrative strategy to promote an Internet of Things network to 
a wider public unfamiliar with the individual stars of Matariki 
Illustration by Juliann Smith. Image used with permission
• Typically relies on technological progress 
and informed by traditional Western 
division between human agencies of 
intangible information, and ‘inert’ matter
• e.g. Digitality and virtuality often staged 
as being ‘better’ for the environment due 
to an assumed lack of tangibility – but 
they need electricity and conductive 
metals, use space, make heat and often 
generate microwaves 
• e.g. claims around big data and how it is 
positioned as a potential saviour in the 
management of resources requires better 
understanding of material, digital and 
spiritual agencies
Beyond Western realist understandings of data 
Who or what a person or living thing is, cannot be 
ascribed to Eurocentric epistemological categories 
when “indigenous thought places the human and the 
nonhuman on equal footing and attributes a 
mysterious activity of the external world” 
Mika, 2017, p. 52
Common to encounter in te Ao Māori the idea that 
all humans and nonhumans have a mauri, and be 
“understood as determining events, as exerting 
forces, as volitional, or as instructing people” 
Hoskins & Jones, 2017, p. 52
“because data originated from a person, people or 
other living thing in the Māori world, the data […] has 
a mauri.” 
Taiuru, 2018, p. 7
Example of live data values for Tōia Mai informing sound 
and lighting interactions
The idea that data has agency is highly disruptive to Western metaphysics as Eurocentric 
notions of scientific objectivity are destabilised
Objective truth about things in the world beyond ‘human finitude’, which is to say, the limits of human sensory 
perception, is based on the precept that quantitative data and the logical consistency of mathematical operations 
provide access to constants that have always existed
These claims are what Kant (1781) called a priori knowledge of the world – which is to say, ‘prior givens’ – or truths that 
exist without human experience of them 
Informed by Descartes, Kant took for granted an ontological division between subjects and objects
Kant thought it impossible to know things as they really are, and the only way humans 
can understand things is through our experiences of them
He called this experiential way of knowing things ‘phenomena’ as a way of distinguishing it 
from the actual things themselves: “phenomena are things as they appear to us, not as 
they are “in-themselves”” (Gratton 2014, p. 19)
In order to have knowledge before experience, certainty was only possible 
through “the shared sensible “form” of experience” (Gratton, 2014, p. 18), which 
was not based empirical data alone, but rather through the correlation of thinking 
about them in a rational manner 
Kant was making the claim that “there are some universal forms of the subjective knowledge of 
things” (Gratton, 2014, p. 18)
To put that another way, because humans are incapable of knowing the world except through 
our own experience, then there are shared sensible ‘forms’ by which this experience can occur: 
“our very experience of the world can take place only under certain conditions of our own 
making” (Shaviro, 2014, p. 6)
It was through accessing these universally known constants that rational thinking could now 
deduce all manner of scientific knowledge in subjects such as geometry, mathematics, physics 
etc., so that the hidden laws of the universe could be revealed in order to exert mastery over it
As he was a European writing in 1781, 
his ‘sensible concepts’ perhaps no longer 
seem as self-evident as they once did, 
particularly when they relate to the 
supposedly universal truths known 
about time, space, and other 
abstractions, like numbers 
If posthumanism can generally be defined as the search “to develop a new philosophy of 
science and a way to move away from Kant" (Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, p. 72), then 
why are Western-informed realist claims to truth so hard to relinquish? 
Perhaps it is because by calling for a greater recognition of the agentic capacities of 
nonhumans, human exceptionalism as a predeterminate of objective knowledge is 
revealed to be both culturally constructed and not exclusive to humans
Whilst this presents something of a crisis for Western science, which has long enjoyed 
its pre-eminent authority on truth and has a vested interest in maintaining this 
position, it presents no such threat to worldviews where “Being is not foremost a 
human attitude.” (Mika 2013, in Mika 2017, p. 38)
Karen Barad’s Agential Realism
Drawing on the quantum mechanics of Niels 
Bohr, phenomena is not ‘inter’- active, but 
‘intra-active’ – agencies are entangled within
phenomena: “distinct agencies do not precede 
their interaction” (Barad 2007, p. 33) 
Things-in-the-world are not atomistic or 
discrete – they do not occur prior to their 
engagement with each other
Agential realism is founded on the idea that:
“Intra-actions always entail particular 
exclusions, and exclusions foreclose the 
possibility of determinism, providing the 
conditions of an open future.” 
Barad 2007, p. 234
“our knowledge-making 
practices, including the use and 
testing of scientific concepts, are 
material enactments that 
contribute to, and are a part of, 
the phenomena we describe”
Barad 2007, p. 32
Technologies of measurement used in 
scientific practices are not in 
themselves neutral and have effect on 
what is being observed, because:
The idea that scientific practices are not in 
themselves neutral, challenges both Western 
scientific prerogative to impartial objective truth, 
but also its humancentric claim on who or what 
can possess knowledge, or agency within, the 
universe:
“There is an important sense in which practices 
of knowing cannot fully be claimed as human 
practices, not simply because we use nonhuman 
elements in our practices but because knowing is 
a matter of part of the world making itself 
intelligible to another part”
Barad, 2007, p. 185 
Barad, is still a realist .It would be unconscionable 
to consider a universe without objectivity, so she 
simply reconfigures its definition: Objectivity is 
the means by which the replicability of material 
phenomena can be achieved
How things are done are is important as what is done
Despite her material emphasis, ‘mattering’ (how 
matter happens) is an ongoing process, where 
acts of measurement have discursive effect:
“discursive practices are specific material 
(re)configurings of the world through which the 
determination of boundaries, properties, and 
meanings is differentially enacted
Barad, 2007, p. 148
When human exceptionalism is 
shown to be false then its 
capacity to act as the 
precondition for objectivity 
collapses. What has for so long 
claimed to be the only ‘real’ truth 
about how the universe operates, 
is instead revealed to be a human 
(cultural) practice
“We are part of the nature we seek to understand” 
Barad, 2007, p. 26
Time and Space
Takarangi pattern cut into top of Tōia Mai
“Space, time, and matter are 
intra-actively produced in 
the ongoing differential 
articulation of the world. 
Time is not a succession of 
evenly spaced intervals 
available as a reference for 
all bodies and space is not a 
collection of pre-existing 
points set out as a container 
for matter to inhabit”
Barad, 2007, p. 234
“The temporal is 
subordinated under the 
cosmic process and denotes 
not time but sequences in 
processes and events which 
occur in the cosmic process.” 
Marsden, 2003, p. 23
“Indigenous holistic 
thought does indeed 
suggest that apparently 
different stages of time are, 
in fact, co-instantaneous”
Mika, 2017, p. 45
What might this mean 
in practice?
Ngā mihi nui
